UNITES STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

1.  Armstrong Cork Company v. World Carpets, Inc., et al., 76 F.R.D. 613, 198 U.S.P.Q. 526 (1977), 448 F.Supp. 1072, 199 U.S.P.Q. 30 (1978); 597 F.2d 496, 203 U.S.P.Q. 19 (1979). Trademark litigation, declaratory judgment. Defendant/Appellee rev’d.

Facts. Armstrong Cork Company announced an intention to change its corporate name to Armstrong World Industries. World Carpets, Inc. objected. World Carpets, Inc. and Armstrong were competitors in the manufacture, sale and distribution of carpet. Upon receiving World Carpets’ objection, Armstrong filed a declaratory judgment petition and a motion for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Upon denial of the motion for summary judgment, the case was tried to the Court and an advisory jury as to damages. World was denied pendant state claims relief and damages, but was granted an injunction. On Armstrong’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted a corporate name change, but in its opinion cautioned that its ruling was “narrow” specifically recognizing that future confusion and likelihood of confusion could exist if Armstrong used the words “world” and “carpet” in its advertising, promotion, labeling, etc.

2.  Hobbs v. Georgia Department of Transportation, et al., 785 F.Supp. 980 (1991); 999 F.Supp. 1526 (1991). See also McPherson v. City of Ft. Oglethorpe, Georgia, 200 Ga. App. 129, 407 S.E.2d 99 (1991) for companion case (state appellate case number 28 below). Plaintiff/Appellant rev’d. JNOV granted by the trial court sua sponte after plaintiff had recovered a verdict below. Plaintiff had gained a verdict against the Georgia Department of Transportation and its design engineers for setting pedestrian crossing time (walk-don’t walk signals), in violation of minimum walk time standards for pedestrians as identified by MUTCD (Manual for Uniform Traffic Control Devices), so as to allow insufficient time for pedestrians to cross a major 4-lane thoroughfare at the intersection of Georgia Highway 2 and Van Cleeve Street in Ft. Oglethorpe, Georgia. Post-verdict, defendant DOT filed belated 11th Amendment immunity defenses applicable to the state agency. The court granted the motion by the state agency without opposition from the plaintiff. The court sua sponte extended 11th Amendment immunity to the individual engineers employed by the State who were responsible for signal timing, holding that the case against the engineers had been contaminated by the inclusion of the agency defendant. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, noting that sovereign immunity had been waived by the purchase of insurance, and further noted that while 11th Amendment immunity applied to state agents acting in their official capacities, they had also been sued in their individual capacities for which neither sovereign immunity nor 11th Amendment immunity was applicable.

3.  Hawthorne Industries v. Balfour Maclaine International, Ltd., 676 F.2d 1395,33 UCC Rep.Serv. 1339 (1982). Plaintiff/Appellant rev’d. Commercial dispute. Plaintiff carpet manufacturing company sued a supplier of raw materials (jute) for damages arising out of the delivery and its attempted use of defective jute. The supplier filed a counter claim for the purchase price of the jute. At trial, evidence showed that the plaintiff attempted to use a portion of the jute received, but found that the jute varied in quality from roll to roll and within a roll, to such an extent that it was necessary to slow down plaintiff’s manufacturing speeds from 20 FPS to 17 FPS, to add additional labor to tend the machinery, and to add additional latex filler.

The trial resulted in a verdict below for the plaintiff, affirming the plaintiff’s right to reject and return the unused jute, affirming plaintiff’s obligation for the purchase price of the jute which it had consumed in its manufacturing process (not contested by plaintiff), but rejecting plaintiff’s claim for damages through application of the doctrine prohibiting speculative damages. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff had established commercial reasonableness in attempting to use the consumed jute, slowing down its machinery, adding latex and labor, etc. Specifically, the court held that a manufacturer would be entitled to an award of consequential damages representing loss of efficiency, excess down time, and additional materials in attempting to utilize defective products in mitigation of loss as consequential damages.